







In the entire history of civilized society
there never has been a time when the concept
of private property was not undergoing
change and it is unlikely that there ever will
be such a time. Since the concept of private
property is a legal concept, it is appropriate
to add that civilized society cannot exist
without law and that law cannot exist without
property. While some may doubt that last
statement, it is believed that such doubts will
be removed upon a few moments reflection.
For whether the legal topic under con-
sideration is the Code of Hammurabi or the
most recent pronouncement from the nearest
local court, the rule of law involved is likely to
be concerned primarily with the relations of
individuals to things. That is to say, it will
concern some concrete application of
society's attitude toward or understanding of
property.
All this leads to the conclusion that any
complete story of the changing concepts of
private property would include a complete
history of civilized society. No such Her-
culean task is undertaken here. This paper
will be limited to a consideration of the
multiple nature of property rights and the
power of the state to add to or subtract from
those rights. Particular emphasis will be
focused upon the owner's right to transfer his
property interests regardless of how those
interests may be defined.
As stated earlier, the concept of private
property is a legal concept. That fact calls for
some preliminary explanation. When the
layman uses the word property, he ordinarily
thinks of houses and lands, articles of
clothing, tools, machinery, and other things
capable of being owned. To the lawyer the
word property has an entirely different
meaning. When the lawyer uses the word
property, he is not thinking of a man's
possessions or holdings. Instead he is thinking
of a man's legal rights with respect to those
things. There is the right to use, the right to
exclude others, the right to sell, the right to
mortgage or pledge, and many others. The
legal profession has rarely ever attempted
any complete catalogue of these rights. As
lawyers they deal with particular rights as
they present themselves without too much
thought concerning other rights that may
exist in the same object. A man's "property"
in a given object consists of the total bundle of
rights he has in that object. This bundle of
rights may be broken up and divided into its
component parts in much the same way that a
bundle of sticks may broken into the in-
dividual sticks of which the bundle is com-
posed.
The use of the term "private property"
necessarily refers to the rights individual
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persons have in or to that particular thing.
But no analysis of such private rights is
complete without some attention being given
to the rights of the group. It is the rights of the
group, either real or pretended, that often
places restrictions upon the rights that may
exist in the individual. The expertise of the
lawyer must be called upon to provide a
working definition of the boundary between
the rights of the private owner and the power
of the state to regulate the use and enjoyment
of those rights. In his efforts to lay out that
boundary the lawyer is faced with the fun-
damental question whether the rights of
dominion and control over the wealth of the
world should rest in the individual or in the
group. If such rights rest ultimately in the
group, then we have common ownership
which places title to the earth's resources in
the state and gives the individual only such
rights of user as the state chooses to confer
upon him. That theory is antagonistic and
foreign to Western traditions, if not in fact to
all civilized traditions. Nevertheless, it is a
theory which, if not understood, is in danger
of being unwittingly accepted.
Almost every American is ready to declare
a strong belief in private property but very
few Americans can give any intelligible
explanation of what they mean by private
property. Sir William Blackstone, a famous
legal scholar who has had tremendous in-
fluence upon Anglo-American institutions,
began his definition of property by calling it
an "absolute right .... which consists in the
free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all (a
person's) acquisitions without any control or
diminution . . ." I Most Americans who have
not given serious thought to the matter would
probably be satisfied to end the definition
there and to accept it as absolute dogma. But
any careful examination of that incomplete
definition will convince us that it is in-
sufficient standing alone. We know that that
absolute right does not actually exist. The
presence of a property tax, however small,
places some qualification upon it. But there
are other qualifications. Our pious assertion
that a man may do as he pleases with that
which is his own is always qualified by the
equally pious assertion that a man may not
use his own in a manner to injure that of
another. Blackstone recognized that the right
was less than absolute but neither he nor
anyone else has ever been able to state
clearly how much less. Blackstone completed
his definition by adding a phrase that tends to
make his entire statement sound paradoxical.
He said property was an "absolute right ....
without any control or diminution, save only
,siby the laws of the land." There is the rub. A
man's property in a given object includes
absolute dominion over that object except in
so far as that dominion is qualified by the
laws of the land. To what extent is that
dominion qualified by the laws of the land? A
more fundamental question could be, to what
extent may it be so qualified?
These are not hypothetical or purely
academic questions. They are questions that
are being encountered daily in the market
place within the context of concrete cases.
And when so encountered they must be an-
swered. The primary responsibility for
providing the answers rests upon the legal
profession, but at least some of that
responsibility must be shared by every
responsible citizen. When the state attempts
to remove a particular right from that bundle
of rights constituting private ownership, it is
the lawyer Who is called upon to decide
whether that right is removable while private
property remains, but it is the citizen whose
right is being taken who must bear the con-
sequences. If private property is a bundle of
1.rights, the lawyer must search for the source
of those rights before he can analyze any
possible restriction upon their exercise. He
must ask, from whence comes this right of
private property anyway? Is it a fun-
damental, inalienable right or is it a mere
privilege granted by the state as a matter of
grace? If it is a mere privilege, it may be
withdrawn by the state. If it may be with-
drawn with impunity, the citizens are little
more than slaves.
Numerous state constitutions have sought
to give expression to the right of private
property as being something that is fun-
damental and beyond the reach of political
power in a free society. One of the strongest of
such statements is that found in the Con-
stitution of Arkansas where it is declared
that, "The right of property is before and
higher than any constitutional sanction."2
But that declaration probably does more to
intensify than to solve the inquiry into the true
source of this right that is "before and higher
than any constitutional sanction." John
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Locke, whose writings were well known and
highly regarded by the founders of the
American Republic, found a philosophical
basis for private property in man's right to
the integrity of, his own body. Locke in-
terpreted the Holy Scriptures, which he
considered binding upon all men, as granting
all wealth of the earth to mankind in common.
But Locke regarded every man as having a
property in his own person, in his own labor.
He then concluded. that a man could by his
labor remove a thing from its state of nature
and place it within his private domain.3
Locke's analysis of this point was accepted by
Blackstone 4 and through him became a part
of the thinking of ordinary citizens of this
country. The extent to which this approach
was diffused among all levels of the citizenry
a few generations ago is illustrated by the fact
that it was included as part of the grade
school reading material provided in one of the
most widely used series of texts available
during the latter part of the nineteenth and
the early part of the twentieth centuries. 5
But Locke, Blackstone, and the state
constitutions all recognize that property
ownership is something less than absolute
dominion. Reference has already been made
to the qualification expressed by Blackstone.
When the writers of the Arkansas Constitution
declared the right of property to be "before
and higher than any constitutional sanction,"
they hastened to add that "private property
shall not be taken . . . . without just com-
pensation, "6 thus recognizing that there were
circumstances under which-private property
could be taken. And when Locke set forth his
doctrine concerning a man's right to assert
his private dominion over the earth's
resources by joining his labor to those
resources, he hastened to add the precaution
that this is true, "at least where there is
enough and as good left." 7 Thus there is
implicit in every analysis available thus far a
recognition of a basic conflict between
private ownership and public control. There
is an awareness that ownership of a thing
does not necessarily mean absolute dominion
over that thing.
All this leads to an inquiry into the meaning
of ownership. A man's property in a thing has
already been described as a bundle of rights
with reference to that thing. Each right in the
bundle of rights may be described as an in-
cident of ownership. In so far as particular
rights may be added to or subtracted from
that bundle without destroying the bundle,
ownership is an arbitrary term. Its meaning
depends upon what incidents of ownership the
law recognizes. The law's recognition of these
incidents has never been a constant or a static
thing. There has been a continuous change
and each change has brought with it a change
in the meaning of ownership and has thereby
caused an alteration in the basic concept of
private property.
Even during the early feudal period in
England it was said that the man occupying
and using a given tract of land owned it, but
his ownership was a very limited one. It was a
system of land tenure under which, in the
strictest sense, land was "held" but not
"owned." The occupant or "owner" on the
land actually held it under a superior lord to
whom he owed certain obligations. The lord in
turn usually held under a still higher lord and
so on in an ascending pyramid with the crown
at the apex as chief lord who, in legal theory,
owned all the land in England. In a very real
sense the "owner" actually on the land tilling
the soil was bound to that land. He could not
sell it without the lord's consent. I It was
thought that this was necessary to avoid the
possibility of having the lord's enemy in-
stalled on the land. The right of inheritance
was restricted in that when the owner died his
heir could not take up the estate until he was
of age and then only upon payment of the
appropriate fees.
There were other incidents of feudal tenure
which tended to restrict the meaning of
ownership but it was the restrictions upon the
freedom to transfer that held the center of the
stage. Even in this tenurial system men oc-
cupying the land were called freemen but in
fact they were not free. The restrictions upon
the individual's right to transfer his holdings
literally tied him to the land. His station in life
was determined more by his status with
reference to the land than by his own efforts
and ingenuity. Of course the intermediate
lord was under a similar burden so far as his
efforts to transfer his own holdings were
concerned. But his position was different in
that his holdings were larger and of a higher
order. He was economically secure and had a
comfortable income. It was the fellow who
had the least that was under the heaviest
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burden for until the man higher up let loose,
there was nothing available for the man at the
bottom to acquire. And whether a clog on the
right to sell is labeled a medieval doctrine of
feudal tenure or some civil rights act of the
twentieth century, its effect in the market
place is the same and the man at the bottom is
always the loser.
Political freedom and the whole gamut of
civil rights were impossible until there
existed the freedom of property which
emerged as the burdens of feudal tenure were
cast off. While these burdens were not cast off
at a single stroke, what is probably the most
significant step along the way took place in
1290 when an act of Parliament extended to
every free man the right to sell his lands or
any part thereof without any interference
from any intermediate lord.I Even after this
enactment numerous burdensome incidents
remained. Prominent among these were the
control the lord had over the estates of
infant heirs and the obligation of the heir to
pay a fee prior to taking up his inheritance.
But with the single leap forward taken in 1290
there began a step-by-step process which
reached its climax when the last substantial
burden imposed by the tenurial system
inaugurated by the Normans who conquered
England in 1066 was finally abolished in
1660. 1o But it should be remembered that it
was truly a step-by-step process and that each
step was characterized by a bitter struggle.
The legal history of that entire period can be
quite accurately described as a struggle for
more incidents of ownership in the individual.
Burdens and restrictions were being removed
and new rights were being acquired by the
owner. The bundle of private rights was
expanding. But the right to sell, including the
right to give away or dissipate according to
the owner's own wishes, continued to hold the
center of the stage. That right to sell, that
economic mobility, or in the jargon of the
legal profession that freedom of alienation
soon became the chief factor in the
development of individual freedom of all
kinds. It also stimulated the economic use of
property. When the occupant of land became
free to sell at a price agreeable to him without
seeking the consent of his lord and without
paying a fine to his lord for having done so, he
began to take on the coloration of a free man
in the true sense of that word. Ownership took
on new meaning. It included a power to cash
in as well as a power to use. And when that
freedom was achieved, men no longer
remained serfs, they no longer remained
slaves, and the economy no longer remained
static. It is no mystery that the real
beneficiaries of this political and economic
transition were those who possessed the
least; it was the "have nots" rather than the
"haves." In any society those who are
already wealthy, who are already en-
trenched, who "have it made" are more
likely to be interested in preserving their
wealth than they are in searching for easier
means of transferring it. Those of lesser
means are the ones who are in a position to
gain from frredom of exchange. And as soon
as free economic mobility was achieved, the
fellow at the very bottom of the feudal
pyramid could exchange his services for a
share of what was held by the man near the
top.
In this system of free exchange, not only,
was there no necessity for serfs or slaves, but
there ceased to be any place for parasites.
Property tended to shift to those who put it to
the most economic use. And there emerged
the day of plenty which, although it is unique
in the history of the world and is to this day
confined to a comparatively small part of the
earth's surface, is so taken for granted in this
country that there is a tendency to forget its
source.
But as soon as man became free to transfer
his property by either deed or will without
interference from the state, other kinds of
interference began to appear. There
developed a theory of absolute ownership
whose very existence tended toward its own
destruction. If property ownership meant
absolute dominion, it was only logical to
assume that it included the power of the
owner to dispose or transfer on his own terms.
He could create any estate or interest he
chose and the fact that the estate or interest
chosen tied up the property in an un-
productive use long after the transferor had
ceased to live appeared to make no dif-
ference. Property became tied up in families
and became unavailable to future
generations. The tying up of property in this
manner is an exercise of freedom of the will, a
favorite freedom of John Locke, but a fair
question to ask is freedom of whose will? It
became a freedom of the dead to control the
economic affairs of the living.
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Both the advantages of freedom and the
manner in which that freedom could be used
to tie up property in a most unfortunate way
can be illustrated by imagining some Sir
Galahad emerging from the feudal period and
finding himself the owner of a farm. What
does that ownership mean? The farm, that is
the soil, was there before Sir Galahad came;
it will be there after he is gone. Sir Galahad's
ownership, his property, does not refer to the
soil. It refers to the rights Sir Galahad has in
that soil. What are those rights? He has the
important right of raising crops of his own
choosing. He may erect whatever buildings
he is capable of erecting. He may live in and
occupy those building. He may exclude others
from them. In addition to all these, and still
other rights, he has the right to transfer his
ownership to another. He may sell it or even
give it away if he chooses. He may do either
without consulting any overlord or anyone
else other than his transferee. He sells his
farm and buys another. He sells that one and
buys still another. He finds that this freedom
of alienation which is now an attribute of
ownership is one of his most important
freedoms. It gives him mobility. It gives him
freedom to change his occuaption, to move his
home to a new location. He is no longer bound
to the land. Sir Galahad is a diligent worker
and a shrewd businessman. His farming
operations prosper. He invests and reinvests.
He buys and sells at a profit until he becomes
the wealthiest man in the community.
Sir Galahad acquired his vast holdings
through the exercise of his own ingenuity in a
free economy. It was the annexation of his
own labor and his own skill to the wealth
involved that made it his own. It would seem
that he should be perfectly free to dispose of
it, not only to a person of his own choosing, but
upon conditions of his own choosing. Suppose
he chooses to dispose of it through a system of
complicated contingent and conditional
schemes some of which might not become
absolute for three or four generations. The
motive for such a plan might be nothing more
sinister than a desire to keep that which has
been earned by the sweat of the brow within
the family blood line. But if this is permitted
in unlimited measure, the freedom to dispose
tends to become a freedom to tie up which in
turn becomes a freedom to prevent rather
than encourage future development. If the
possessory owner has a mere life estate or
some other restricted interest, he will have
little interest in making permanent im-
provements which will endure beyond his
period of ownership. And even if he is so in-
clined, it is unlikely that he will have the
ability to do so. He is not in a position to give
the kind of mortgage necessary to get a
favorable loan. Under these circumstances
the freedom enjoyed by Sir Galahad extends
beyond his own lifetime and restricts the
freedom of future generations.
But a people who had made great personal
sacrifice to free themselves of one kind of
restriction upon their right to deal with the
fruits of their own labor could hardly be ex-
pected to remain passive about accepting the
same or similar restraints in another form.
Having freed themselves from so many
stultifying public restraints imposed by a
system of feudal tenure, Englishmen were
well prepared to resist any effort to impose
the same restrictions through private
arrangements. The result was a modification
of the law of entails and the invention of
numerous rules designed to prevent any
private interference with economic mobility.
It was in this atmosphere that those rules
known to lawyers as the destructibility rule
and the rules against perpetuities, ac-
cumulations, and restraints on alienation
came into being. While a substantial body of
rather complex law has grown up around the
operation of these rules, in their essence they
are nothing more than efforts to secure to the
living generation control of the world's assets
without interfering with the freedom of
alienation any more than is absolutely
essential to the accomplishing of that pur-
pose.
Thus it was that the freedom of alienation,
that is the individual's freedom to buy and sell
as he sees fit, became the policy goal that
gave birth to numerous rules of property law
that persist to this day. In addition to its being
the sole justification for the rules referred to
above, much of the modern law of con-
veyancing is law designed to foster the free
transferability of property. It is a frequent
topic for discussion at bar association
meetings and legal institutes. Title standards
are adopted and marketable title legislation
is enacted for this purpose.
The American Founding Fathers and those
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concerned with the framing of state con-
stitutions appear to have been thoroughly
convinced that the free institution of property
was the cornerstone upon which all other
freedoms depend. This fact is demonstrated
by the frequency with which provisions were
inserted into their statutes, or even their
constitutions, declaring that all lands are
allodial, that is free, and that feudal tenures
of every kind are forever prohibited. 11 They
looked upon the right to cash in on the product
of one's own labor as an essential element of
any meaningful concept of a free man. They
saw it as the right to elevate the human.
personality -from a position of status where
one's social and economic course is
predetermined to a position of contract where
each one is free to determine his own course.
Or as a more recent writer has expressed it,
"in organized societies the degree of liberty
among human beings is measured by the
right to own and manage property, to buy and
sell it, to contract." 12
Experience has shown that where f
movement of property has existed
economy has prospered and the weal
especially the wealth of the least wealthy,
multiplied. This is not a surprising result. I
merely the normal and natural result
giving a man an opportunity to employ
talents in a way most pleasing to him and
enjoy the fruits of his efforts in the manner
selects. If he is denied the right to niake
own choice, society is denied the benefit of
productive efforts that choice would dema
The productive capacity of the individual, a
hence the' productive capacity of society a
whole, will tend to decline. This principle
implicit in the statement of Jeremy Benth
that, "No nman can be-so good a judge as
man himself, what it is gives him pleasure
displeasure." 13 The same idea is suppor
by Ludwig von Mises' declaration that, "T
average man is both better informed and l
corruptible in the decisions he makes as
consumer than as a voter in political el
tions.'" 14
But this long history of the expansion
individual rights to property does not me
that private dominion has now become
solute. It never has been absolute and it
doubtful if anyone will seriously contend t
it should be made absolute. The state s
does, and it is believed it must, retain so
control. Property taxes are still collected.
The right of eminent domain is still exercised.
During times of war or other national
emergency property has been requisitioned
or expropriated when necessary to the state's
defense. These acts by* the state are
necessarily encroachments upon the in-
dividual's dominion over the things he
acquires. The significant question to ask is
how far may these encroachments extend?
Fundamentally, it is a problem of defining the
point at which the inalienable. rights of the
private owner end and the inherent power of
the state begins. It is not too much to say that
that question presents the most challenging
problem facing the legal profession, and in
fact the entire American society, at the
present time. The future course of man's
progress toward personal liberty, human
dignity, and civil rights depends upon how he
answers that question.
In recent years zoning and city planning
have become important parts of American
ree law. It is'not within the scope of this paper to
the make any 'judgment as to whether that
th, development is good or bad. But it is within
las the scope of this paper to point out that it is a
t is development that constitutes, a direct en-
of croachment upon the 'freedom -of. the in-
his dividual to do as he pleases with his own
to property. Where such schemes 'are in
he operation the individual owner is not -free to
his devote his property to the uses most 'suitable
the to his, -'needs.'- An incident of property
rid. 6*nership has. been removed. An important
Lnd'* right has been taken from the bundle of rights
s a constituting the owner's property in a given
is tract of land.sa
the ... Other'rights are slipping from the bundle
or from time to time. It is conceivable that in
ted - some instances the loss mighit be necessary to
'he 'the well -being of society. The distressing
ess - thing is that the loss often goes unnoticed.
a During World War I it was felt necessary to
ec- *place statutory restriction ' upon the amount
of rent a man could' receive for a given
housing unit.' After the war most of these
'of regulations were removed. During World War
an II 'rent controls were again inaugurated and
ab- this time they have been a little slower in
is' their disappearance. Some are still in. effect.
hiat And in some quarters statutory rent control is
till -now being accepted as a permanent in-
me! stitution. This' paper is not an appropriate
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place to debate the merits or demerits of this
kind of legislation but it is an appropriate
place to call attention to its meaning. It was
first presented to the public as an emergency
war measure but more recently it has been
referred to as an instrument for the creation
of a new type of tenancy. It has been said that
the "statutory tenant," that is a tenant whose
rent is determined by a statute rather than by
the market, has a new type of estate hitherto
unknown to the law. He probably does. But
that kind of analysis is incomplete unless it
goes further and identifies the kind of estate
held by the ."statutory landlord." And this
second step has rarely ever been taken. If the
question is raised at all, the answer is likely to
be that the landlord has a fee simple which is
defined as the highest estate, that is the
highest kind of ownership, known to the law.
If that answer is accepted as satisfactory,
then it must be admitted that the owner of the
highest estate known to the law is denied the
privilege of using his holdings in the manner
most desirable to him. He is not permitted to
rent at a price mutually agreeable to him and
his tenant. A substantial incident of owner-
ship has been removed.
In 1948 the Supreme Court of the United
States struck at the very heart of private
ownership as traditionally understood.
Although the decision received wide
publicity, very few people gave any indication
of being disturbed; or if they were disturbed,
it was-for reasons other than the court's at-
tack upon private ownership. Prior to 1948 the
power to dispose of real property included the
power to make certain covenants mutually
agreeable to the buyer and seller. Prior to
1948 these covenants were said to run with the
land and to be binding upon subsequent
owners. The existence of such covenants
became a part of the title itself and entered
into the calculation of property values. But in
1948, in the case of Shelley v. Kraemer, IS the
Supreme Court of the United States was faced
with a covenant against sale or lease to
members of a particular race. . Such
covenants had long been inserted in deeds and
had become quite common in all sections of
the United States. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court chose to ignore the covenant's
existence. The fact that property values
depended upon the covenant and that mort-
gage loans might have been extended in
reliance upon it made no difference. This
might possibly have been an appropriate time
for a judicial determination that covenants of
this particular kind were inconsistent with
American public policy and therefore without
any legal effect. No position is taken here as
to whether such a decision would have been
wise or unwise. But in any event that route
was not taken. Instead the court, in an opinion
written by the Chief Justice, displayed a total
lack of concern for private property by
declaring that the covenant was valid but
would not be enforced.
. Any effort to rationalize the 1948 decision on
the theory of state action is antagonistic to
civilized society unless that society is ready to
deny recognition of private property
altogether and adopt absolute group
ownership. A man does not have a property in
anything unless he has a right which the state
will protect. As soon as the state extends any
protection there is clearly a case of state
action. If protection is -withheld while the
right is officially recognized, there is an
express invitation to self help where the law
of the jungle prevails.
An even more serious inroad on private
ownership has appeared in recent years in the
so-called ''open housing" legislation. When
this type of enactment appeared on the local
scene in New York City in 1957, 16 it caused
very little excitement among the nominal
adherents of the free market concept. This in
spite of the fact that it almost completely
,abandoned the theory of freedom of alienation
by taking away from the seller the right to
choose his own customers. More specifically,
it prohibited sellers in certain classifications
from discriminating among buyers because
of the buyers' race or religion. Freedom of
alienation was theoretically preserved, but
anyone who has had any experience in buying
or selling real estate knows that freedom of
alienation has very little meaning if it does
not include the freedom to choose one's own
customers. The freedom that was preserved
by this legislation is remarkably similar to
the freedom that prevailed in England prior
to 1290 when the property owner was free to
sell except that the lord (the king being the
supreme lord) had a veto power over the
choice of a buyer. Nevertheless, the
legislation in varying forms became popular,
spread to other states, and found its way into
a Federal enactment in 1968. 7 Prior to its
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enactment on the Federal level testimony
before the Senate Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights pointed out that its effect in
the market place would be to reduce the
amount of new housing available in coming
years and to decrease rather than increase
the access of minority groups to that which
was available. 18 It would be a mistake to
attribute the recent decline (some might
prefer to say crisis) in the housing industry to
that cause alone but it would also be a
mistake to ignore the possibility that it might
have been a contributing factor.
The concept of private property appears'to
be moving in a circle that is almost closed.
The feudal ages found "freemen" in virtual
serfdom. Private ownership existed but it was
a very limited concept. The incidents of
ownership were comparatively few and such
as existed were substantially restricted by
the recognized power of the state. But that
period was a period of struggle for more and
more freedom and more civil rights in the
individual. Men were demanding more
control over their own destiny-more of the
fruits of their own labor. The result was a
steady increase in the incidents of private
ownership and a corresponding reduction in
the state's power to control. The significant
legal developments were centered around
efforts of the lakv to preserve the freedom of
movement of private property. This trend
continued until very recent times when the
individual's freedom both to use and to
dispose of the fruits of his own labor seemed
virtually secure.
But throughout this period of development
there never was any clear line between the
conflicting forces, that is to say, between the
incidents of ownership sacred to the in-
dividual on the one hand and the rights
exercised by the state on the other. Even-
tually the trend toward individual freedom
found itself in reverse. The bundle of rights
constituting ownership began to shrink.
Sticks were withdrawn from the bundle and
handed over to the state. The state took a
more active part in controlling the use of
things still owned by individuals. The owner
lost his right to fix the price at which he was
willing to rent. He lost the right to dispose of
property on terms of his own choosing. He lost
the right to select his own customers.
Why is this decline in the importance of the
individual together with the corresponding
increase in the function of the state taking
place? It could be the result of a conscious
choice by a society Which believes it has gone
too far in the direction of private ownership
and that a retreat is desirable. It is doubtful if
that is the case. It is doubtful that any such
conscious choice is being made. What is more
likely is that the transition is going more by
default than by design. We have concerned
ourselves so much with other things that we
have almost forgotten that there is a right of
property which "is before and higher than
any constitutional sanction." We talk about
such things as freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, freedom of religion, and freedom
from false arrest without giving much at-
tention to the foundation upon which all these
freedoms rest. We have forgotten that these
are but the symbols, the ornaments, and the
outward manifestations of a solid structure
without which none of them could exist. We
have become so interested in the cake's icing
that we have ignored the cake. We have
become victimized by the often repreated but
absolutely false assertion that there is a
conflict between property rights and human
rights. The truth is that private ownership of
property is the greatest instrument of
freedom ever designed and it is sheer folly to
speak of granting a man freedom while
withholding that instrument from him.
It is a long way from the serfdom of the
medieval manor to the American statutes and
constitutions abolishing feudal tenures.
Americans have arrived at an age when
freedom of ownership is so taken for granted
that there is a danger that we might inad-
vertently allow it to slip out of our hands. If
our freedom is to be taken seriously, we must
acquaint ourselves with what is actually
happening in the name of social justice, equal
protection of the law, and other glittering
generalities that are without meaning until
they are given meaning in the context of
human experience. "Social justice" can
become a slogan used to promote both social
and personal injustice. "Equal protection of
the laws" can be used as a mask for universal
oppression through law.
As we move from one age to another there
is but one fundamental change in the concept
of private property. The rate of the change as
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well as the direction of the change may shift
from time to time. But the question is always
one of deciding what incidents of ownership
rest in the individual and what incidents are
claimed by the state. If human freedom is to
be preserved that question must be faced
squarely. Questions concerning zoning, rent
control, restrictive covenants, and all the
others cannot be intelligently answered until
they are placed within the context of that
basic issue. When they are placed within that
context, it is likely that the most vocal
proponents of some of these new schemes will
become their most violent critics.
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